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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

DANIEL BAGLEY ROGERS

:

Defendant/Appellant

Case No. 20030953-CA

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). The Honorable Pat B. Brian, Judge, Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah denied Defendant/Appellant's Daniel Bagley
Rogers ("Mr. Rogers" or "Appellant") Motion to Quash the Bindover for trial on Theft
by Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-408(1999). R. 175-181. A copy of the denial to Quash Bindover is in Addendum
A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION
Mr. Rogers filed a Motion to Quash Bindover where insufficient evidence was
presented at the first preliminary hearing to support the charge of Theft by Receiving
Stolen Property as a second degree felony but the magistrate allowed the state to "reopen" the preliminary hearing, after it had rested its case, and continued the hearing to

another date to allow the state to present sufficient evidence to support a second degree
felony charge.
Issue. Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Rogers' Motion to Quash the
Bindover concluding that the state presented sufficient evidence at the first preliminary
hearing and determining that even if the state's evidence was insufficient it was simply
an "innocent miscalculation of the evidence necessary to bindover" which would not
have precluded refiling?
Standard of Review: The issue of whether to bind a case over for trial involves a
question of law which this Court reviews de novo without deference. State v. Rivera ,
954 P.2d 225, 227 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Perservation. This issue was preserved below pursuant to State v. Serv. 758 P.2d
935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). R. 48-54, 175-181; 222:47,56; 223:66-67; 226. A copy of
the Sery plea is in Addendum B.
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following rules and constitutional provisions are in Addendum C:
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(3)
UtahR.Evid. 1102
Utah Const, art 1, § 7.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 14, 2002, Mr. Rogers was charged with one count of Theft by
Receiving Stolen Property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
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6-408 (1999), and one count of Theft by Deception, a class B misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999). R. 1-3. On November 4, 2002, the state filed a
motion to continue the preliminary hearing set for November 7, 2002, because an
essential witness was unavailable. R. 21-22. The state's motion was granted. R. 23-24.
The preliminary hearing was rescheduled for November 26, 2002. R. 25. On November
26, 2002, Mr. Rogers failed to appear and the court issued a bench warrant. R. 206.
The preliminary hearing was rescheduled for December 17, 2002. R. 207.
At the December 17, 2002 preliminary hearing, after the state had rested its case,
defense counsel asked the court not to bind Mr. Rogers over, arguing that the state
presented insufficient evidence to support the charge of theft by receiving stolen property
as a second degree felony and the theft by deception charge. R. 222:45-47. The state
moved to re-open its case to present more evidence. R. 222:47. The court allowed the
state to re-open its case over defense counsel's objection. R. 222:47. After presenting
further evidence, the state argued in favor of bindover. R. 222:50-54. The court
expressed concern about the sufficiency of the state's evidence regarding the specific
items recovered and their values which could be attributed to Mr. Rogers. R. 222:51, 5456. The court continued the hearing to allow the state to provide evidence on the proof
of value element for the property that had been recovered which could be attributed to
Mr. Rogers. R. 222:57-59. The preliminary hearing was continued until January 7,
2003. R. 222:62-63. At the January, 7, 2003 preliminary hearing, defense counsel
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renewed her objection to the court for allowing the state to re-open its case. R. 223:6667. At the conclusion of the second preliminary hearing, the court bound Mr. Rogers
over on the charge of theft by receiving stolen property as a second degree felony but
found insufficient evidence to bind him over on the charge of theft by deception. R 223:
126, 128.
On April 10, 2003, Mr. Rogers filed a Motion to Quash the Bindover in the Third
District Court arguing the magistrate erred in permitting the state to re-open and continue
its case after having rested. R. 48-54. The state filed a memorandum in opposition to the
Motion to Quash Bindover on April 29, 2003. R. 153-158. On April 29, 2003, the
district court heard arguments on the Motion to Quash Bindover. R. 224. On June 16,
2003, the district court denied Mr. Rogers' Motion to Quash Bindover. R. 175-181. On
September 15, 2003, Mr. Rogers entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to State v.
Sery, to an amended charge of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree felony.
R. 217, 226. See Addendum B. On October 28, 2003, Mr. Rogers was sentenced to an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years and fined $5,000. R. 219. Mr. Rogers
prison term and fine were suspended and he was placed on probation for 36 months. R.
220. Restitution was ordered. R. 221. A timely notice of appeal was filed on November
18,2003. R. 191.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. FACTS REGARDING THE TWO PRELIMINARY HEARINGS
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On August 14, 2002, Mr. Rogers was charged with Theft by Receiving Stolen
Property, a second degree felony and Theft by Deception, a class B misdemeanor. R. 13. The preliminary hearing was scheduled for November 7, 2002. R. 21. On November
4, 2002, the state filed a motion to continue the preliminary hearing because an essential
witness was unavailable. R. 21-23. The state's motion was granted and the preliminary
hearing was rescheduled for November 26, 2002. R. 23-25. On November 26, 2002, the
preliminary hearing was again rescheduled until December 17, 2002, when Mr. Rogers
failed to appear. R. 206-207.
A. The First Preliminary Hearing
At the December 17, 2002 preliminary hearing the state presented testimony from
three witnesses: Mr. Robert Hildebrand, the alleged victim; Mr. Elvin Allen, a baseball
card shop owner; and Detective Clinton Johnson, from the Salt Lake County Sheriffs
Office. R. 222.
Mr. Hildebrand testified that his apartment had been burglarized on July 23, 2002.
R. 222:6-26. After the burglary, Mr. Hildebrand put together a list of the items missing
from his apartment. R. 222:11, 22. Mr. Hildebrand testified generally as to items that
were missing including a DVD player, a camera, a stereo, autographed baseballs,
individual baseball cards, binders of baseball cards, black pearl earrings, and Olympic
pins. R. 222:7-11. Mr. Hildebrand also gave general testimony regarding what he
thought each of these missing items was "probably" worth. R. 222:8-11. Although Mr.
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Hildebrand did not have the list available to reference at the hearing, he testified that the
list itemized the property that was taken and their values. R. 222:26.
Mr. Hildebrand called all the baseball card shops and gave them a partial itemized
list of his most valuable baseball cards that were missing and asked them to keep a look
out for the cards. R. 222:11-12, 27, 29, 30. About an hour later, Elvin Allen, had two
individuals come into his shop to sell baseball cards. R. 222:28. Mr. Allen recognized
many of the cards from the itemized list as those that were reported missing by Mr.
Hildebrand. R. 222:28, 30. Mr. Allen testified that he picked out a few cards and wrote
the individuals a check, telling the individuals that they would be unable to cash the
check that day because it was a holiday. R. 222:28. Mr. Allen then stopped payment on
his check and called Mr. Hildebrand to tell him his merchandise was at the shop. R.
222:13, 28. Mr. Allen did not recognize Mr. Rogers as the individual that was in his
shop that day. R. 222:27. Mr. Allen could not remember in whose name the check was
made out. R. 222:28. Mr. Allen testified that there was no relationship between the
check amount and the value of the cards. R.222:31. Mr. Allen testified that he had no
idea what the value of the baseball cards would have been. R. 222:31.
Later that day, Mr. Allen's caller l.D. indicated that a check-cashing facility was
trying to reach him. R. 222:28. Mr. Allen then called Mr. Hildebrand and gave him the
telephone number of the check cashing facility. R. 222:28-29. After receiving Mr.
Allen's telephone call, Mr. Hildebrand called the sheriffs office. R. 222:13. Detective
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Johnson responded to a page that two individuals were being detained by the West
Valley Police and a sheriffs deputy for trying to cash a check that had been written to
them by Mr. Allen. R. 222:33-34. Although Detective Johnson did not have the check
available to reference during the hearing, he testified that he "believed" the check was
made out to Mr. Rogers. R. 222:34, 50. The prosecutor also did not bring the check to
court to show whether Mr. Rogers' name was on it. Detective Johnson testified that Mr.
Rogers had told him that he found the baseball cards by a dumpster in the area of the
storage units he cleans. R. 222:38. Mr. Hildebrand was then called down to the check
cashing facility to identify a baseball which was in the front seat of the co-defendant's,
Joshua Boone,1 girlfriend's vehicle (the vehicle). R. 222:14, 36, 39. Detective Johnson
testified that although he had never seen Mr. Rogers in the vehicle in question, he was
told by the co-defendant, Mr. Boone, that Mr. Rogers had asked for a ride. R. 222:36,
44. Detective Johnson also "believe[d]M Mr. Rogers may have discussed with him that he
had ridden in the vehicle. R. 222:36.
In addition to recovering the baseball in the front seat, Mr. Hildebrand testified
that he recovered his other autographed baseballs except "may be one or two." R.
222:14. Mr. Hildebrand recovered a lot of his individual baseball cards but not the most
valuable ones. R. 222:14. The binders of baseball cards had been recovered but the

'Mr. Boone plead guilty on November 19, 2002 to an amended charge of Theft By
Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree felony. R. 27.
7

pages "had been taken out and shuffled" and some of the pages were missing. R. 222:15.
Two Willie Mays cards had also been recovered which Mr. Hildebrand estimated were
worth $400 each. R. 222:24. Detective Johnson testified that several items were
recovered from the vehicle which included several baseball cards in binders from the
trunk, an autographed baseball in the front passenger seat, and a sealed baseball card on
the passenger's side floorboard. R. 222:36. Detective Johnson teslified that several
items were also recovered from a search of co-defendant Boone's apartment (the
apartment) including the DVD player, several baseball cards in binders and in loose
photo sheets, and the Olympic pins. R. 222:41.
At the end of Detective Johnson's testimony the state rested its case. R. 222:44.
Defense counsel then asked the court not to bind Mr. Rogers over on a second degree
felony charge because, among other things, the state had failed to present sufficient
evidence that the value of the items recovered were or exceeded $5,000. R. 222:45-47.
Defense counsel also asked the court not to bindover on the theft by deception charge.
R. 222:46. Defense counsel argued that the state had failed to link Mr. Rogers with any
of the property which was recovered from the apartment and the vehicle. R. 222:46.
Defense counsel also argued that the only items which might be linked to Mr. Rogers,
although it was very tenuous, were the cards that were sold to the card shop. R. 222:4546. However, the value of those cards had not been established by the state. R. 222:46.
After defense counsel pointed out the deficiencies in the state's evidence, the
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prosecutor stated that she "was just given some more information" and asked to re-open
the state's case to take further testimony from Detective Johnson. R. 222:47. Defense
counsel objected to the state's motion. R. 222:47. The court allowed the state to re-open
its case and take further testimony from Detective Johnson. R. 222:47. Detective
Johnson testified regarding the black pearl earrings taken from Mr. Hildebrand's
apartment. R. 222:48. Detective Johnson testified that he was given the list of all the
items taken from Mr. Hildebrand which he used to identify the earrings at a pawn shop.
R. 222:48-49. Detective Johnson testified that there was a pawn receipt with Mr. Rogers
name on it but he did not have it available to show the court. R. 222:49. The prosecutor
also did not bring the pawn receipt to court to establish that Mr. Rogers' name was on it.
Instead, Detective Johnson testified that the pawn receipt was left in evidence at the
sheriffs office. R. 222:49. Defense counsel again objected to Detective Johnson's
testimony, arguing, inter alia, that there was no proof of the pawn receipt to link Mr.
Rogers to the earrings. R. 222:49.
The state then argued again in favor of bindover. R. 222:50-51. The court
concluded that the additional testimony from Detective Johnson regarding the black pearl
earrings was inadmissible hearsay evidence. R. 222:51. Urging the court to reconsider,
the prosecutor attempted to explain its failure to bring in the pawn receipt stating:
Well, I think my argument to that would be . . . that the detective had seen
it with his own eyes and he's the officer-1 mean, he testified to that, he's
under oath- that it was a pawn receipt. And he also has the earrings in
evidence.
9

And unfortunately, I understand this stuff isn't here today. The State had a
problem with subpoenas, I called him last minute, and he showed up.
So, if the Court is not thinking they're going to bind over, the State would
also ask for a continuance to bring in that information which is in evidence;
but I think that there's . . . plenty for a preliminary hearing.
R. 222:51-52.
The court again concluded that the additional testimony was inadmissible hearsay
evidence and stated that it was Ma little concerned at the level of evidence [it was]
seeing." R. 222:52. The state again attempted to explain its failure to provide the
necessary evidence stating:
And I guess, your Honor, I mean, I have-my first argument would be that,
even without that pawn ticket, it's sufficient to bind this over, just being
that he was detained at the Money Mart, where they had just gone to try
and pawn these cards.
If it's not, we do have this up in evidence. As I said, I call Detective
Johnson out of- our subpoenas got mixed up, our victims had been waiting
here for four hours, so I called him and had him run in. He didn't have the
time to go to-to the evidence.
R. 222:54.
The court determined it had enough evidence to bindover but was concerned that
the state had failed to specifically identify the value of the items recovered which could
be attributed to Mr. Rogers to support a second degree felony. R. 222:54-56. The court
then continued the preliminary hearing to allow the state the opportunity to present
sufficient evidence as to the value of the recovered items that could be attributed to Mr.
Rogers. R. 222:56, 58. Defense counsel objected to the continuance arguing that the
10

state had already been given "the opportunity to present that evidence" and defense
counsel had elicited testimony from every witness that "there was proof of all of these
items, [but the state] simply . . . opted not to do it." R. 222:56. In explaining its decision
to continue, the court expressed concerns regarding the "bare minimum[]" level of proof
that was being presented at preliminary hearings by prosecutors "in these cases tying
values, people to objects and things like that." R. 145:60. The preliminary hearing was
then continued until January 7, 2003. R. 145:63-64.
B. The Second Preliminary Hearing
At the beginning of the second preliminary hearing, defense counsel renewed her
objection to the court for allowing the state to re-open and continue the hearing. R.
223:66-67. The state then called Mr. Hildebrand back to the stand to testify regarding
the value of the items recovered. R. 223:69-113. Unlike the first hearing, the state
introduced eleven photographs of the items recovered from the apartment and vehicle to
elicit detailed testimony from Mr. Hildebrand regarding the value of the items pictured.
R. 223:69-113. In addition, the state also utilized the itemized list that Mr. Hildebrand
had made of the property that was missing and their values which all the witnesses had
referred to in the first preliminary hearing. R. 223:70. With the aid of the itemized list
and the photographs of the recovered property, the court found that the state was able to
establish probable cause of the value necessary to bind Mr. Rogers over on Theft by
Receiving Stolen Property, as a second degree felony. R. 233:126. Defense counsel
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objected and again argued that the state had failed to link Mr. Rogers to the property
found in the vehicle and the apartment. R. 233:117-119. The court found that there was
a sufficient enough nexus between Mr. Rogers and the property found in the vehicle's
trunk and the apartment to allow it to be attributed to Mr. Rogers. R. 233:121-125.
Although, the court determined that Mr. Rogers could only be linked through his
admission to the baseball cards, it nevertheless determined the state had presented
sufficient evidence that the value of the cards recovered exceeded the $5,000 threshold.
R. 223:125 However, the court found their was insufficient probable cause to bind Mr.
Rogers over on the charge of theft by deception. R. 233:126, 128.
2. Motion to Quash Bindover
On April 10, 2003, Mr. Rogers filed a Motion to Quash the Bindover. R. 48-54.
Mr. Rogers argued that there was insufficient evidence to bind him over on the offense
of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property as a second degree felony and that the magistrate
erred in allowing the state to re-open and continue its case. R. 48-54. Mr. Rogers argued
that a motion to re-open a preliminary hearing is not a recognized motion under the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure. R. 48-54. Mr. Rogers raised concerns that defense counsel
is often running into this situation where the state is simply re-opening its case once
defense counsel has pointed out its deficiencies. R. 48-54; 224:4-5. Mr. Rogers pointed
out that the state's remedy, in not having the evidence it needed to support all the
elements of the offense, was to dismiss the case without prejudice and then refile. R. 48-
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54. However, the state opted to go forward with the preliminary hearing with the
evidence it had. R. 48-54. Therefore, defense counsel argued this was not a case where
the prosecutor innocently miscalculated the quantum of evidence needed for a bindover.
R. 48-54; 224:4.
The state argued that it had presented sufficient evidence in the first preliminary
hearing to bind Mr. Rogers over on a second degree felony. R. 153-158; 224:10-12, 15.
The state also argued that there was no prejudice because it could have refiled its case
and the testimony would have come in. R. 153-158. The trial court agreed with the state
that there was sufficient evidence presented at the first preliminary hearing to show that
Mr. Rogers possessed the required $5,000 or more of property. R. 180. In addition, the
trial court determined that even if the state presented insufficient evidence at the first
preliminary hearing, the fact that a motion to re-open is not a recognized procedure
would not have precluded the state from re-filing because the prosecutor innocently
miscalculated the evidence necessary to bindover, therefore, it was harmless error. R.
180 n.2.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it denied Mr. Rogers' Motion to Quash, concluding that
the state presented sufficient evidence at the first preliminary hearing and determining
that the granting of the state's motion to re-open and the continuance of the preliminary
hearing was harmless error, because if the charges had been dismissed the state could
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have simply refiled under Rule 7(i)(3) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure since the
prosecutor "innocent[ly] miscalculated]. . .the evidence necessary to bindover. R. 180.
However, the record supports that the prosecutor did not innocently miscalculate the
evidence needed for bindover but was dilatory in her preparation and took a calculated
risk in going forward with the first preliminary hearing without the evidence needed to
obtain a bindover. Taking such a calculated risk rather than dismissing and re-filing,
does not qualify as an "innocent miscalculation," justifying refiling. Rather, when a
prosecutor's unpreparedness results in insufficient evidence necessary for a bindover,
refiling under Rule 7 is limited by due process and the principles ofBrickey.
The prosecutor's failure to prepare resulted in the state's inability to present
sufficient evidence on essential elements of the offense. The state failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Rogers possessed or controlled the recovered
property found in the apartment and the vehicle. The state also failed to present
sufficient evidence on the proof of value element of the offense to support a second
degree felony charge. The prosecutor knew that this case dealt with very "unique" items
where a value would not be easily attributed to the recovered items. However, the record
demonstrates that the prosecutor failed to elicit testimony from the witnesses or come
prepared with the evidence necessary to establish these elements.
Once the magistrate determined that the state had presented insufficient evidence
on essential elements of the offense, Rule 7 mandated that the magistrate dismiss the
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information or bind defendant over on a reduced charge. Court rules do not allow
magistrates to re-open or continue a hearing, under these circumstance, to allow the state
another opportunity to present sufficient evidence on essential elements of the offense.
Such a practice is potentially abusive because it is akin to allowing the state to dismiss
and refile a case while effectively circumventing due process and the protections outlined
in Brickey. Because the prosecutor's dilatory preparation would have prohibited the
state from refiling, the magistrate's decision to allow the state to re-open and continue
the hearing was not harmless.
ARGUMENT
POINT. A PROSECUTOR'S CONSCIOUS DECISION TO PROCEED
WITH A PRELIMINARY HEARING DESPITE BEING UNPREPARED
DOES NOT QUALIFY AS AN "INNOCENT MISCALCULATION" OF
THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR BINDOVER: TO
ALLOW THE STATE TO RE-OPEN AND CONTINUE A CASE IN
ORDER TO ESTABLISH ALL THE ELEMENTS OF AN OFFENSE
AFTER IT HAS TAKEN SUCH A CALCULATED RISK VIOLATES
DUE PROCESS AND THE PRINCIPLES OUTLINED IN BRICKEY .
A. Due Process and Brickey Limit Refiling Under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the state to refile a charge
after its "dismissal and discharge" by a magistrate. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(3).2 While rule
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Rule 7 does not allow the state to "re-open" the preliminary hearing once it has
rested its case, nor does it allow for a continuance under these circumstances. See Point
B supra; see also State v. Johnson, 1989 Utah App. LEXIS 172, *3 (October 30,
1989)(unpublished opinion) (determining that "[a] motion to "reopen" a preliminary
hearing is not a motion recognized in the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure"). Even
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7 gives the state discretion to institute a "subsequent prosecution for the same offense,"
that discretion is limited by the Brickey jurisprudence. In State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644
(Utah 1986) the supreme court held that "due process considerations prohibit a
prosecutor from refiling criminal charges earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence
unless the prosecutor can show that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced
or that other good cause justifies refiling." Id. at 647; see also State v. Redd, 2001 UT
113,1[13, 37 P.3d 1160; State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87,1fl 1, 34 P.3d 767. In Morgan.
2001 UT 87 at ^[19, the supreme court adopted "innocent miscalculation" as a
subcategory of "other good cause." In doing so, the court cautioned "that the
miscalculation must be innocent" (id. (emphasis added) "and not be used for purposes
which would violate due process rights of the defendant." Redd , 2001 UT 113 at ^13.
"By limiting the circumstances under which the [s]tate may refile criminal charges, this
rule ensures that the defendant is not harassed by repeated charges on tenuous grounds."
State v. FisL 966 P.2d 860, 864 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Hence, while rule 7(i) does allow
refiling in some circumstances, due process and Brickey limit refiling to circumstances

though the case was not dismissed and refiled in this instance, Appellant argues that the
principles of Brickey and due process apply. This is not only because the trial court
incorrectly determined that had the charges been dismissed, instead of the state being
allowed to "re-open" and continue the preliminary hearing, the state would not have been
precluded from refiling but also because the result of re-opening and continuing the
hearing was akin to dismissing and refiling thereby implicating the very same
fundamental fairness and due process concerns addressed in the Brickey jurisprudence.
See Conclusions of Law R. 180 n.2; see. also Point B.
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where the state has new or previously unavailable evidence or some other circumstances
exist which rise to the level of good cause to justify refiling.
Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, the due process concerns which were
addressed in the Brickey jurisprudence demonstrate that when an unprepared prosecutor
consciously decides to go forward with a preliminary hearing and fails to establish
sufficient evidence on all the elements of the offense charged, it cannot be claimed that
the prosecutor's failure was simply an "innocent miscalculation of the quantum of
evidence necessary to bindover," justifying refiling. If prosecutors were allowed to go
forward with preliminary hearings unprepared, then permitted to refile when they fail to
meet their burden under the guise that they simply miscalculated the amount of evidence
necessary for a bindover, prosecutors would be permitted to refile every time a case is
dismissed, and none of the due process protections which are served by limiting refiling
would be met.
Because the primary purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether
sufficient evidence exists to warrant further proceedings, M[t]he preliminary hearing thus
acts as a screening device to 'ferret out.. .groundless and improvident prosecutions.'"
Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646 (quoting State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah
1980)). The role of the preliminary hearing in "ferret[ing] out.. . groundless and
improvident prosecutions . . . is important because it not only relieves the accused of the
'substantial degradation and expense' attendant to a criminal trial, but also because it
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helps conserve judicial resources and promotes confidence in the judicial system."
Brickev, 714 P.2d at 646 (citing Anderson, 612 P.2d at 784). Precluding the state from
refiling unless new or previously unavailable evidence or other good cause exists ensures
that groundless or improvident prosecutions do not proceed, protects the defendant from
the degradation and expense of having to defend at more than one preliminary hearing,
conserves judicial resources by not allowing the state to repeatedly waste court time by
refiling cases and conducting multiple preliminary hearings, and prevents prosecutors
from "harras[ing] defendants by refiling criminal charges which had previously been
dismissed for insufficient evidence." Brickev, 714 P.2d at 647. These Brickey
protections directly apply in this case where the effect of the re-opened or continued
preliminary hearing implicates the very same fundamental fairness and due process
concerns. See n.l; Point B.
"Considerations of fundamental fairness preclude vesting the State with such
unbridled discretion [to reopen or continue a preliminary hearing]" Brickey, 714 P.2d at
647 (citing Jones v. State. 481 P.2d 169, 171 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); Stockwell v.
State. 573 P.2d 116, 138-39 (Idaho 1977); People v. Walls . 324 N.W.2d 136, 138 (Mich.
App. 1982)). This is true not only because of the "'substantial degradation and expense'"
(Brickev. 714 P.2d at 646 (quoting State v. Anderson. 612 P.2d 778, 784 (Utah 1980)) of
being subjected to multiple preliminary hearings, but also because the good faith of the
prosecutor fails to protect the accused from the potential harassment when a prosecutor
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has complete freedom to re-open or continue a preliminary hearing. Id.. Indeed, "the
potential for abuse [is] inherent in the power" to re-open or continue a preliminary
hearing without any limitation as it is in the power to refile. Id_ at 647 (citing inter alia
Holmes v. District Court. 668 P.2d 11, 15 (Colo. 1983)).
Brickey recognized that the act of refiling itself constitutes harassment, squanders
judicial resources, and is fundamentally unfair in violation of due process unless the
prosecutor establishes that new evidence has surfaced or other good cause exists. IcL_ at
646-47; see also Redd. 2001 UT 113 at^|20, Morgan. 2001 UT 87 at 1fl5, Fisk, 966 P.2d
at 864. Brickey jurisprudence also recognized that a prosecutor's failure to introduce
evidence on an element of the charged offense does not qualify as "innocent" and refiling
would violate a defendant's due process rights. Id. at 648; see also Redd, 2001 UT 113
at ^fl7. The same is true of allowing a prosecutor, who is unprepared to establish the
essential elements of the offense charged, the opportunity to re-open or continue a
preliminary hearing. If not, and a prosecutor's unpreparedness, which results in a failure
to present sufficient evidence necessary for a bindover is held to qualify as an "innocent"
miscalculation, then there would be no ramifications for a prosecutor who simply decides
to take a chance and go forward with the preliminary hearing unprepared. Such a rule
would likewise lead to multiple preliminary hearings in many cases, thereby requiring
increased judicial resources, while also subjecting defendants to the degradation and cost
of repeatedly defending the charge. Such a rule would also strip preliminary hearings of
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their role as a discovery tool since prosecutors could put on only a bare bones case, then
either re-open and continue or re file the information if they miscalculate the amount of
evidence needed.
If such conduct would qualify as "innocent," the Brickey rule would be
eviscerated since it is difficult to contemplate any situations which would not qualify as
"innocent." However, "[o]verreaching by the State, in any of its forms, is the chief evil
[the Supreme Court] sought to prevent in Brickey." Morgan, 2001 UT 87, TJ15, 34 P.3d
767. Such conduct does not qualify as "innocent" and due process thereby not only bars
refiling but prohibits re-opening or continuing a hearing where a prosecutor makes a
calculated decision to go forward with a preliminary hearing unprepared and fails to
produce sufficient evidence on essential elements of the offense. Therefore, the trial
court erred in determining that had the magistrate followed criminal procedural rules and
not allowed the state to re-open and continue the hearing when it had failed to produce
sufficient evidence, the state would not have been precluded from re-filing.
1. Brickey and Due Process Bar Refiling and Prohibit Re-Opening or
Continuing A Preliminary Hearing Where A Prosecutor Makes a Calculated
Decision To Go Forward With the Hearing Unprepared and Fails to Produce
Sufficient Evidence On Essential Elements of the Offense.
The supreme court has determined that the state does not innocently
miscalculate the quantum of evidence when it fails to present evidence on an essential
element of the crime. See Redd 2001 UT 113 at *|17. Surely, fundamental fairness,
"[t]he lodestar of Brickey," would dictate that a prosecutor who goes forward with a
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preliminary hearing unprepared likewise does not "innocently" miscalculate the quantum
of evidence but, instead, engages in a potentially abusive practice which raises a
presumption against refiling. Morgan. 2001 UT 92 at 1fl5; Redd. 2001 UT 113 at TJ13
("when potential abusive practices are involved, the presumption is that due process will
bar refiling."). Indeed, this type of calculated decision by a prosecutor is the very type of
"abusive practice" the Brickey jurisprudence and due process seeks to prevent. R. 157.
Therefore, the trial court erred in determining that the state would not have been
precluded from refiling if the charges had been dismissed because "there were no abusive
practices involved in the State's motion to reopen, but simply an innocent miscalculation
of the evidence necessary to bindover." R. 180 n.2.
The presumption, that the state has violated a defendant's due process rights and
is barred from refiling, can only "be overcome by showing that new or previously
unavailable evidence or other good cause justifies refiling." Id. The record, in this case,
does not support such a showing justifying refiling. Instead, the record indicates the
prosecutor was dilatory in her preparation which caused her to fail to meet the state's
burden of proof on essential elements of the offense during the first preliminary hearing.
The prosecutor was aware that this case involved the recovery of very distinctive
items stating "[tjhis case is unique in that the items that were stolen are baseball cards
and other memorabilia that won't have an easy value attached to them . . . ." R. 223:68.
Evidence of possession or control and proof of value of the recovered property are two
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clear and essential elements in establishing a second degree felony charge of theft by
receiving stolen property. See Utah Code Ann.§76-6-412 (l)(a). Therefore, it was
imperative for the state to not only link Mr. Rogers to the recovered property but
decipher, with specificity, which of the unique items were recovered and their correlating
value. Instead of having the evidence available which was necessary to establish the
proof of value element and Mr. Roger's link to the recovered property, the prosecutor
went forward with the preliminary hearing ill prepared to meet the state's burden.
During direct examination of the state's witnesses, the prosecutor was not
prepared to elicit testimony that might establish what specific property was missing or
recovered and its value. Each witness testified on several occasions that they had an
itemized list of the missing items and their values that they used to identify the recovered
property. R. 222:11, 21-22, 25-27, 29-30, 48. However, the prosecutor failed to make
the list available to assist the witnesses with their testimony in ascertaining for the court
which of the unique items listed were recovered and their correlating value. Without the
list or exhibits of the recovered property, the witnesses were only able to engage in a type
of guessing game as to what items were missing or recovered and their value. For
example, Mr. Hildebrand could only speculate during his testimony regarding what he
was missing and the items "probablfe]" worth. R. 222:8-10. Mr. Hildebrand testified in
part that "[t]here was a series of autographed baseballs missing, the most valuable of
which was . .. I think it's worth well over 500 now." "I think there were eleven other
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baseballs . . . and they probably are worth..." "There were about ten binders missing, of
cards." "[S]everal sets of cards that are very specialty . . .And Pm guessing that each of
those sets had a value ..." R. 222:8-9; Se^ also supra Point a. These types of
speculative statements are indicative of the rest of Mr. Hildebrand's testimony. In fact,
Mr. Hildebrand testified during cross-examination that without the assistance of his
itemized list he was unable to remember specifics regarding his autographed baseballs
stating "I would have to bring you the list. We may have the list available of- of who all
the name were on the balls." R. 222:21 "I can't remember if it's not there[.]" R. 222:21.
Later, Mr. Hildebrand did remember some of the names on the baseballs he was missing
but again was only able to speculate as to their value. R. 222:21-22.
The prosecutor was also unprepared to elicit anything more than speculative
statements from the witnesses in an attempt to establish whether the items "recovered"
were indeed worth $5,000 or more as is required under the statute. See 76-6412(l)(a)(i). For example, Mr. Hildebrand testified that he recovered such items as, the
"most valuable" baseball, he "believe[d] all of [the autographed baseballs]" although
"there may be one or two missing," "[a] lot of the cards . . . but unfortunately most of the
valuable ones were not recovered," "many of the binders" although "pages . . . are
missing." R. 222:14-15. Detective Johnson's testimony equally consisted of very
ambiguous testimony regarding what was actually recovered. Detective Johnson testified
in part that "several items, several baseball cards in folders" "a signed baseball" and "[a]
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sealed baseball card" were recovered from the vehicle. R. 222:36.
The evidence that may have taken this testimony out of the realm of speculation,
the list and exhibits, the prosecutor did not bring to the first preliminary hearing. So
although the prosecutor recognized the uniqueness of the items missing and the difficulty
in establishing a value, she did not come to the first preliminary hearing prepared with
the very evidence that all the witnesses testified they used to assist them and that Mr.
Hildebrand specifically testified he needed to remember the specifics about the recovered
property and its value. Furthermore, the evidence the prosecutor admited in the second
preliminary hearing amplifies the prosecutor's lack of diligence in preparing for the first.
Unlike the first hearing, the state found it necessary to introduce eleven photographs of
the items recovered from the apartment and vehicle and the itemized list to assist Mr.
Hildebrand in remembering specifics regarding the value of the items pictured. R.
223:69-113.
Finally, the prosecutor's dilatory preparation is most illustrative during her attempt
to establish probable cause on the charge of Theft by Deception when she implicitly
acknowledged that she was not adequately prepared for the first preliminary hearing. R.
2; 222:28-32, 48-54. To support this charge the prosecutor needed to provide probable
cause evidence that Mr. Rogers "obtained or exercised control over the property of
Drawn Pawn by deception, with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and that the
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value of said property is less than $300. R. 2.3 The prosecutor had to produce sufficient
evidence to establish a link between Mr. Rogers and the cards sold to Mr. Allen.
Alternatively, the prosecutor had to link Mr. Rogers to the pawned black pearl earrings.
See n.3. However, the prosecutor failed to bring in either the check allegedly written by
Mr. Allen for the sale of the baseball cards or the pawn receipt for the black pearl
earring, therefore, there was no evidence linking Mr. Rogers to the items and the charge
was ultimately dismissed. R. 223:128.
In regard to the baseball cards sold to Mr. Allen, Mr. Allen was only able to give
general testimony regarding two individuals who came into his shop with "a bunch of
cards." R. 222:28. Mr. Allen testified that he did not recognize Mr. Rogers as one of
those individuals. R. 222:27. Mr. Allen "picked out a few of [the baseball cards]" and
wrote the individuals a check. R. 222:28. Mr. Allen could not remember in whose name
the check was made out. R. 222:28. Mr. Allen testified on cross-examination that there
was no relationship between the value of the cards and the amount of the check. In fact,
Mr. Allen had no idea what the value of the cards he purchased would have been. R.

3

It was later clarified that the check written by Mr. Allen for the baseball cards
was meant to serve as the basis for this charge. "Drawn Pawn" was incorrectly
transcribed and should have been "Crown Pawn. However, the court determined that it
understood the evidence regarding the black pearl earring to serve as the basis for the
Theft by Deception charge concluding to not bind the charge over on that basis. R.
223:127-28. Regardless of the ultimate reason the court decided not to bind over this
charge, this charge is referenced to further highlight the prosecutor's lack of
preparedness to go forward with the preliminary hearing.
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222:31.
The prosecutor never elicited testimony about the amount of the check, never
elicited testimony about the specific cards Mr. Allen picked out to buy, never elicited
testimony about the specific cards Mr. Hildebrand came and recovered from Mr. Allen,
and never elicited testimony about the cards Mr. Allen had on his itemized list that he
used to identify Mr. Hildebrand's missing cards. Similarly, Detective Johnson was only
able to testify that he nbelieve[d]" the check was made out to Mr. Rogers. R. 222:37.
However, Detective Johnson could not link Mr. Rogers to the baseball cards bought by
Mr. Allen because he did not know whether the check related back to the baseball cards
sold to Mr. Allen since he "never responded to the baseball card shop where the check
originated from." R. 222:37. Indeed, the prosecutor could not link Mr. Rogers to the
check because she failed to bring to court the actual check to establish who it originated
from, in whose name it was made out, and the amount.
After the state rested, defense counsel argued for the court not to bindover. R.
222:45-47. After defense counsel had pointed out the state's failure to meet its burden of
proof, the state asked to re-open the hearing to take further testimony from Detective
Johnson regarding the pawning of the black pearl earrings. R. 222:47. Over defense
counsel's objection, the court allowed the state to re-open their case. R. 222:47.
Upon re-questioning, Detective Johnson testified that he recovered the black pearl
earrings from a pawnshop. R. 222:48. Detective Johnson testified that he was able to
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identify the black pearl earrings from the list given to him of all the items missing from
Mr. Hildebrand. R. 222:48. Detective Johnson testified that there was a pawn receipt
that indicated that Mr. Roger's pawned the earrings, however, the detective did not bring
that receipt to court. R. 222:49. The prosecutor also did not bring a copy of the receipt
to link Mr. Rogers to the pawned earrings. In arguing again in favor of bindover, the
prosecutor stated that M[a]nd although we don't have the check here today, you heard
from the officer that he had seen the check and . . . he believes it was made out to [Mr.]
Rogers." R. 222:50 (emphasis added). The court determined that the additional
testimony was inadmissible to show the earrings were pawned. R. 222:51.
In an attempt to persuade the court to change its determination, the prosecutor
implicitly acknowledged that she was not prepared to go forward on the case stating:
And unfortunately, I understand this stuff isn't here today. The State had a
problem with subpoenas, I called him last minute, and he showed up.
R. 222:52.
After the court reiterated its position on the pearl earrings, the record again
illustrates that the prosecutor knew she was not prepared to go forward with the
preliminary hearing stating:
And I guess, your Honor, I mean, I have-my first argument would be that,
even without that pawn ticket, it's sufficient to bind this over, just being
that he was detained at the Money Mart, where they had just gone to try
and pawn these cards.
If it's not, we do have this up in evidence. As I said, I call Detective
Johnson out of- our subpoenas got mixed up, our victims had been waiting
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here for four hours, so I called him and had him run in. He didn't have the
time to go to-to the evidence.

R. 222:54 (emphasis added).
The prosecutor knew7 that the recovery of unique items was in question here and
that ambiguous testimony would not establish the essential elements of the offense. If
the prosecutor had prepared, she might have known that the itemized list that each
witness testified to having and pictures of the recovered property would be necessary to
have at the hearing in order to assist the witnesses in ascertaining what property was
specifically recovered and its value. In addition, had the prosecutor prepared, she might
have known that the other significant pieces of evidence, the pawn receipt and the check,
would be necessary in establishing the alleged link to Mr. Rogers with the recovered
property. However, it wasn't until the second preliminary hearing that the prosecutor
came prepared with Mr. Hildebrand's itemized list and exhibits to establish the proof of
value element. See R. 223.
Concluding that the prosecutor's failure to present sufficient evidence on essential
elements of the offense under these circumstances simply amounted to an "innocent"
miscalculation of the quantum of evidence would eviscerate the holdings in the Brickey
jurisprudence and the due process protections they provide. Futhermore, allowing a
prosecutor to re-open or continue a preliminary hearing after she has made a conscious
decision to go forward unprepared would fly in the face of the consideration of
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fundamental fairness outlined in the Brickey jurisprudence and would subject defendants
to the very type of abusive practices the supreme court set out to curb. Therefore, the
trial court erred in failing to quash the bindover.
2. Brickey and Due Process Bar Refiling and Prohibit Re-Opening or Continuing
A Preliminary Hearing When the State Fails to Produce Sufficient Evidence On
Essential Elements of the Offense.
In Redd, the supreme court added to the list of potentially abusive practices
determining that the state does not "innocently miscalculate" the quantum of evidence
necessary for bindover when it fails to "provide any evidence on a clear element of the
relevant criminal statute." Id at ^fl7. The supreme court held that refiling after a
dismissal under such a circumstance is a "potentially abusive practice" raising "the
presumption . . .that the [s]tate has violated the due process rights of defendant." kL_ The
court's decision demonstrates the state's essential burden of proof, at a preliminary
hearing, is to "introduce sufficient evidence to persuade the magistrate that there is
probable cause to believe that the crime charged had been committed and that the
defendant has committed it. . . ." State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646 (internal quotations
and citations omitted). And although the "evidence need not be capable of supporting a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," the state still must produce "believable
evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^[15, 20
P.3d300.
In this case, the evidence when "viewed in a light most favorable to the
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prosecution", and "drawing all reasonable inferences in the prosecution's favor," did not
support a finding of probable cause that Mr. Rogers possessed or controlled the property
recovered from the apartment or the vehicle and failed to establish that the value of the
recovered property supported a second degree felony. State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26,
Tfl3, 44 P.3d 730. Therefore, the trial court erred in determining that the state produced
sufficient evidence establishing Mr. Rogers "was in possession or control of $5000 or
more of stolen property." R. 180.
a. The state failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Rogers
possessed or controlled the recovered property found in the apartment or the
vehicle.
The state charged Mr. Rogers with Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408. Section 76-6-408 (1) -(2)(a)
lays out the relevant elements of this offense which are:
A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling,
or withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be
stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it.
The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the
case of an actor who: (a) is found in possession or control of other property
stolen on a separate occasion.

Possession or control of the recovered property is a clear and essential element of
this offense. See State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1986) (discussing elements of
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possession of stolen property). Once the magistrate determined he would continue the
preliminary hearing he indicated his predisposition for finding all of the recovered
property found in the apartment and the vehicle to be in Mr. Rogers possession.4 R.
222:56-58; 223:117. Because the evidence would at most support that Mr. Rogers was a
passenger in the vehicle, it was necessary for the state to put on some evidence to support
a probable cause finding that Mr. Rogers was in constructive possession of the property
recovered from the vehicle's trunk and the apartment. See State v. Layman. 1999 UT 79,
TJ13, 985 P.2d 911; State v. Salas. 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v.

initially the magistrate indicated that Mr. Rogers would only be found to be in
possession of the baseball cards based on "the statements made by [Mr. Rogers] to the
officer and the statements made by the co-defendant." R. 222:55-57. However, once the
magistrate decided to continue the hearing he determined he was not "going to cut it
[that] closely" and concluded that Mr. Rogers would be found in possession of all the
recovered property found in the vehicle and apartment. R. 222:57-58. At the conclusion
of the second preliminary hearing the magistrate once again determined "that [the] other
items were not included" and Mr. Rogers would only be found to be in possession of the
baseball cards recovered. R. 223:125.
The trial court concluded that ff[d]efense counsel did not object" to the
magistrate's decision that the recovered property found in the apartment would be
considered. R. 180. To the extent that this conclusion is actually a finding of fact, it is
erroneous. See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). The record supports
that defense counsel not only argued at the first preliminary hearing that there was no
evidence linking Mr. Rogers to the recovered property found in the vehicle and
apartment [R. 222:45-46] but demonstrates defense counsel's objection to Mr. Rogers
being attributed with the recovered property from the vehicle and apartment was again
argued at the conclusion of the second preliminary hearing and the magistrate considered
and ruled on the objection. R. 222:56-58; 223:117-125; See_ State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d
769, 776 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (noting defendant's objection timely because he "met the
requirement of raising and obtaining a ruling on his constitutional objection in the trial
court, to preserve it for appeal" (citation omitted)).
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Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1985). To show that Mr. Rogers constructively possessed
the recovered property, "it is necessary that 'there be a sufficient nexus between [Mr.
Rogers] and the [recovered property] to permit an inference that [Mr. Rogers] had both
the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the [recovered
property].5" Layman, 1999 UT 79 at If 13. However, the prosecutor failed to present
sufficient evidence to support a probable cause finding that Mr. Rogers constructively
possessed or controlled the property recovered from the vehicle or apartment.
The evidence regarding the recovered property from the vehicle is as follows:
1. Mr. Hildebrand was called down to a check cashing facility in West
Valley to take a look at a baseball that was sitting on the front seat of a car.
R. 222:13-14. Mr. Hildebrand was able to identify this baseball as "one
that was the most valuable of all those . .. balls that [he] had mentioned
before." R. 222:14.
2. Part of the property was recovered from a vehicle that was lent to codefendant Boone specifically. R. 222:43-44.
3. Detective Johnson had seen the recovered property in co-defendant
Boone's girlfriend's vehicle. R. 222:36. "[T]here were several items,
several baseball cards in folders, like photo albums in the trunk." R.
222:36. "[I]n the front passenger seat, there was a baseball, a signed
baseball, that was in a case, a plastic square case. And there was also
another sealed baseball card on the - I believe it was on the floorboard of
the passenger side." R. 222:36, 40-41.
4. Detective Johnson had "never seen [Mr. Rogers] in the vehicle." R.
222:36. Detective Johnson "believe[d]" Mr. Rogers may have discussed
with him that "he had ridden in the vehicle or that he had shown up with
the" codefendant. R. 222:36
5. Although Detective Johnson had never seen Mr. Rogers in the vehicle,
co-defendant Boone had told him that Mr. Rogers had asked Boone for a
32

ride to sell some cards. R. 222:43-44.
The only evidence offered regarding the recovered property from the apartment
was elicited during cross-examination and was as follows:
1. Detective Johnson did not have any information that Mr. Rogers resided
at co-defendant Boone's apartment. R. 222:42. Detective Johnson
believed that Boone shared the apartment with his girlfriend. R. 222:41.
2. A search of co-defendant Boone's apartment revealed "[t]he DVD/CD
player, . . . several cards, and the Olympic pins, things like that." R.
222:41. Binders were recovered from under the bed, in the kitchen
cupboards and in the furnace room. R. 222:41.
Other than this above testimony defense counsel elicited, no evidence was offered
by the state to link Mr. Rogers to the property recovered from the apartment. In fact, the
state never even addressed nor attempted to elicit any testimony regarding the recovered
property found from the apartment. The evidence presented might tenuously establish, at
most, a nexus between Mr. Rogers and the recovered property found inside the vehicle
which consisted of "a baseball" and "a baseball card." However, the evidence presented
regarding the recovered property from the vehicle's trunk and apartment, even when
viewed in a light most favorable to the state, fails to establish a sufficient nexus with Mr.
Rogers to permit an inference that he had both the power to exercise dominion and
control over this recovered property.
Therefore, because the state failed to show that Mr. Rogers had possession or
control over the recovered property, it failed to present sufficient evidence on an
essential element of the offense barring refiling under Brickey and due process.
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Alternatively, even if the evidence established that Mr. Rogers possessed or controlled
the baseball and card found inside the vehicle, insufficient evidence was presented on the
value of these items to support the charged offense. See Point b.
b. The state failed to present sufficient evidence on the proof of value element
to support a second degree felony charge.
In addition to producing sufficient evidence on the elements listed in section 766-408, it was imperative for the state to produce sufficient evidence on the proof of value
element making this offense a second degree felony, meaning the "value of the property
or services [was] or exceeded] $5,000." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(a)(i). If the
state's evidence on the proof of value element was less than $5,000, the degree of the
offense drops accordingly. Hence, if "the value of the property . . .is or exceeds $1,000
but is less than $5,000" the offense is punishable as a third degree felony. Utah Code
Ann § 76-6-412 (l)(b) (2003). If "the value of the property . . . is or exceeds $300 but is
less than $1,000" it is punishable as a class A misdemeanor. IdL (l)(c). If "the value of
the property . . . is less than $300" it is punishable as a class B misdemeanor. Ll_ (l)(d).
At the first preliminary hearing, the magistrate determined that the prosecutor
presented insufficient evidence on the proof of value element stating "I don't have
enough information about how much material was found and the value of the material
found as contrasted with the value of the material stolen... I can't assume that all the
material that was possessed actually was all the material stolen...." R. 222:58.
Nevertheless, the trial court, in denying Mr. Rogers' motion to quash, concluded that the
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state had presented sufficient evidence at the first preliminary hearing to establish that
Mr. Rogers "was in possession or control of $5,000 or more of stolen property." R. 180.
The evidence from the first preliminary hearing even when viewed in the light
most favorable to the prosecution only establishes that the witnesses were at most
engaged in a type of guessing game as to what exactly was missing and its probable
worth.
The state offered the following evidence from Mr. Hildebrand regarding what
property he was missing and his speculation as to what it was worth.
Well, the DVD player is a very top line model and retails for about $750.
There was a camera missing that's worth about 200. There was a stereo
missing that originally costs about 900, it's probably worth four or five
hundred now.
There was a series of autographed baseballs missing, the most valuable of
which was-I bought many years ago, for about 400 and I think it's worth
well over 500 now. There were several other-there was- I think there were
eleven other baseballs besides that one and they probably are worth, three
of them are worth about fifty bucks and the others are all worth about a
hundred to 150, each.

There were about ten binders missing, of cards . . . There were several sets
of cards that are very specialty, not just normal card sets, but very hard to
put together. And I'm guessing that each of those sets had a value
anywhere from 200 to $500. And there were about six of those contained
within those pages, or more. So, that's probably just in those, maybe about
$3,000.
There were cards based on individual players, some star players of the past,
and-and just hundreds and hundreds of cards on each one of those. And
those cards probably were easily worth another $2,000.
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. . . but there was definitely a black pearl earring set that was gone.. . . but
the black pearl earrings alone originally cost me twelve hundred and fifty
dollars and are probably worth about fifteen hundred now.
The cards that were underneath the bed, those were all individually encased
car-cards in individual little plastic containers. There was a series of cards
there that are autographed by players from 50 years ago that are still alive.
And there's only 200 of each of those players' cards in existence in the
world. And I had about 50 of those. And - no, that's not correct, I had
about 35 of those; and the most valuable, which was a Willie Mays, there
were three of those5, those are worth four hundred each. And there were
other players, worth in the hundred and fifty to two hundred dollar range,
and then others, perhaps about a hundred or less....

And that's just one series. There were quite a few other cards. This-this
box contained about 300 cards of various types.

. .. There were some Olympic pins. I have collected those since the
Olympics this year. There were several very special ones that were in little
cases that looked like jewelry . . . . And there was probably a couple
hundred dollars' worth of those.
R. 222:8-11.6
5

Mr. Hildebrand later clarified that he actually was only missing two Willie Mays
cards. R. 222:24.
6

The trial court found that this testimony established that the following items were
"stolen."
Specifically, an unopened six disc, DVD player worth $750, a minolta 35
mm camera worth $200, a pioneer stereo with a six disc player, originally
worth $900 present value $400-500, twelve (12) autographed baseballs
total value between $1450-1850, ten (10) binders of baseball cards total
value about $5,000, autographed cards total value between $5330-6400, a
set of black pearl earrings originally cost $1250 with a present value of
$1500, and Olympic pins worth $200.
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It is impossible to decipher from this ambiguous testimony which specific items
Mr. Hildebrand was in fact missing. This testimony failed to establish such things as
what "series of autographed baseballs" these were, who autographed the baseballs, what
"specialty" cards were in these binders, what are "very specialty" cards, how many cards
are in a "set of cards", and how many and what type of cards are in a "binder."
Moreover, Mr. Rogers was not charged with burglary so charging him with the value of
all the missing items would not be appropriate. See. State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402,
^[24, 40 P.3d 1143 (holding "[defendant may be ordered to pay restitution only for
pecuniary damages resulting from the crime of receiving stolen property, and not for
damages resulting from the burglary"); State v. HilL 727 P.2d 221, 223 (determining
defendants could only be found guilty for value of property found in their possession, not
total value of stolen items).
The evidence offered by the state regarding the recovered property was equally
unavailing in discerning the value of the property. Mr. Hildebrand testified that he had
recovered the baseball from the front seat of the vehicle which "happened to be the
particular one that was the most valuable of those . . .balls that I mentioned before." R.

R. 176. While the trial court's finding only determined what items were stolen and not
recovered, it is clearly erroneous to the extent it was used to determine the value of the
recovered property. Even assuming that the value of the missing property was over
$5,000, that does not satisfy the proof of value element which requires the state to prove
that the recovered property had a value of $5,000 or more.
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222:14. However, Mr. Hildebrand's earlier testimony regarding this "most valuable"
baseball did not detail what type of baseball it was or why it was the "most valuable,"
instead, we are left with Mr. Hildebrand's speculation that the most valuable ball "I
bought many years ago, for about 400 and I think it's worth well over 500 now." R.
222:8 (emphasis added). No reference was made as to how Mr. Hildebrand came to the
conclusion of the baseball's present worth. Even assuming arguendo that Mr. Rogers
could be found in possession of this baseball found inside the vehicle, and this Court
finds that Mr. Hildebrand's testimony establishes its worth, it would only support a class
A misdemeanor.
The state then asked Mr. Hildebrand if he had "received anything back, other than
that baseball?" R. 222:14. Mr. Hildebrand answered, again in very general terms that he
had received
All of the baseballs that I mentioned before, the autographed balls. I_
believe all of them, there may be one or two missing, but I think they're all
there. A lot of the cards that had been in the box underneath [the bed], but
unfortunately, most of the most valuable ones were not recovered. Many of
the binders, they had been all rearranged, all the pages had been taken out
and shuffled and-and I'm sure some are missing out of those binders,
because of that. I had stacks and stacks of empty pages -or of pages with
cards in them that were not in the binders, that had to be put back in the
binders, so I spent quite a bit of time trying to get them back in order and
trying to figure out what's missing or not missing because of that.
R. 222:14-15 (emphasis added).
The state never attempted to have Mr. Hildebrand testify regarding which specific
items were recovered or their value. During cross-examination, Mr. Hildebrand testified
38

that both of the Willie Mays cards were recovered which had a value of $400 each,
unfortunately, most of the valuable cards were not recovered. R. 222:24. However,
testimony was not offered regarding where the Willie Mays cards or other property were
recovered from or how they could be attributed to Mr. Rogers.
The testimony elicited from Mr. Allen by the prosecutor also failed to assist in
establishing the value of the recovered property. Although Mr. Allen testified that he
recognized some of the cards the two individuals were attempting to sell to him, the state
never elicited testimony about which cards they were that he purchased and that Mr.
Hildebrand subsequently recovered. R. 222:28-29. In addition, Mr. Allen testified there
was no relationship between the amount he had written the check for and the value of the
cards. R.222:31. In fact, Mr. Allen testified that he had no idea what the value of the
baseball cards would have been. R. 222:31.
The only other evidence offered regarding the recovered property was Detective
Johnson's testimony. Detective Johnson testified on direct examination about the
property found in the vehicle stating:
Well, there were several items, several baseball cards in folders, like photo
albums in the trunk, which were seized incident to arrest; but in the front of
the car, there was a -in the front passenger seat, there was a baseball, a
signed baseball, that was in a case, a plastic square case. And there was
also another sealed baseball card on the -I believe it was on the floorboard
of the passenger side.
R. 222:36 (emphasis added).
Again, even if the baseball and baseball card found in the passenger seat could be
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attributed to Mr. Rogers, the state failed to establish their value. Defense counsel
attempted to elicit more specific information from Detective Johnson regarding the
recovered property. Detective Johnson testified during cross-examination that several
items were recovered in a search of the co-defendant's apartment including "[t]he
DVD/CD player,. .. several cards, and the Olympic pins . . . [and] a lot of loose photo
sheets with cards in them." R. 222:41. However, this testimony still did not clarify what
specific property was recovered to enable a value to be ascertained.
In sum, the state presented only speculative and ambiguous testimony which did
not establish the proof of value element of the charge let alone establish how the missing
items found in the apartment and vehicle could be attributed to Mr. Rogers. R. 222:41.
Even viewing this evidence regarding the recovered property in a light most favorable to
the prosecution, and drawing all reasonable inference in favor of the prosecution, it does
not support a finding of probable cause that Mr. Rogers possessed or controlled
recovered property that was or exceeded $5,000. The state failed to sustain its burden of
proof by presenting sufficient evidence on the proof of value element to support a second
degree charge and the charged offense should have been dismissed or reduced
accordingly.
Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that the state produced "sufficient
evidence to establish the second degree felony charge before the Court granted the
State's motion to reopen." R. 179 (emphasis in original). Because the state failed to

40

present sufficient evidence on essential elements of the offense it would have been
barred from refiling under Brickey and due process.
B. Appellant's Due Process Rights Were Violated When The Magistrate
Allowed The State To Re-Open Its Case And Continued The Preliminary
Hearing To Allow the State to Provide Evidence on The Proof Of Value
Element of the Offense; Because the State Would Have Been Prohibited From
Refilingy The Error Was Not Harmless.
The magistrate's decision to allow the state to re-open and continue the
preliminary hearing to present sufficient evidence to support a probable cause finding on
an essential element of the offense violated the mandatory language of Rule 7 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, the decision which is akin to a dismissal and
refiling allowed the state to circumvent due process and the Brickey jurisprudence when
it would have been prohibited from refiling had the case been dismiss or the offense level
lowered due to the magistrate's determination at the first preliminary hearing of
insufficient evidence to support a second degree felony. R. 222:54-61.
Rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides in relevant part the following:
(i)(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the
crime charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the
magistrate shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. . . .
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(3).
The language of Rule 7 is mandatory. The rule instructs the magistrate that if
insufficient evidence has been provided to support the charge then the information
"shall" be dismissed. The rule does not provide for the re-opening of a preliminary
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hearing or its continuation under these circumstances. Further, this Court has determined
that a motion to re-open a preliminary hearing is not a recognized motion under Utah's
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Johnson. 1989 Utah App. LEXIS 172, *3 (October 30,
1989) (unpublished opinion); see_ also n.2. In addition, Rule 1102, Utah Rules of
Evidence, only allows for the continuation of a preliminary hearing where "the
magistrate finds that the hearsay evidence proffered or admitted is not sufficient and
additional evidence is necessary for a bindover." Utah R. Evid. 1102 (c)(1). In this
case, the judge did not continue the hearing based on the proffered hearsay evidence but
instead stated that he would "continue [the hearing], if-if I don't think I've got enough
for value, I'll continue to get the value resolved." R. 222:54.
After determining the state had failed to provide sufficient evidence on the value
of property recovered the judge stated "I will continue it for further hearing on the value
and the issue of value will be the only issue that is in play." R. 222:58. While Rule 1102
would have presumably allowed the judge to continue the hearing on the issue of the
pawn receipt, the judge's primary basis for continuing the hearing was to allow the state
to provide evidence as to the value of the recovered property. Only after the judge had
decided to continue the hearing did he state that "because we are going to re-open this, it
doesn't make sense to me to close .. .it off as to the pearls, so that issue is still open." R.
222:58. However, defense counsel objected and the state stipulated that it would not
bring in more evidence on the earrings stating "it will simply be the value of what was
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found.1' R. 222:59. Therefore, the continuation of the preliminary hearing to allow the
state to establish the proof of value element was not a valid basis under rule 1102.
The court determined the state had provided sufficient evidence to permit the
court to bind Mr. Rogers over, however, the court also determined that the state had
failed to meet its burden regarding the value of the property recovered which could be
contributed to Mr. Rogers7. R. 222:54. The court stated:
Well, let me tell you what my concern is. I think there's enough to bind
him over, and the question I have is the value issue. And I'll tell you how
I'm looking at that and I'll hear from both of you, I will give enough - I
will continue it, if - if I don't think I've got enough for value, I'll continue
to get the value resolved.
What I have is that there's a large amount of material stolen, and we've got
enough value as to the material and there's specifics as to the material. The
value I have as to specific material is that - I've had testimony, was
involved here in some way, and we can address that more specifically; and
what I'm looking at is an autographed baseball, of various values from $50
to $500, one autographed baseball was found, it was cased, but there's
no-there's no testimony as to identify it in any way, based on the testimony
I've seen. So, it was worth at least $50, maybe $500.
A number of baseball cards. And-and I believe given the statements made

7

It is unclear from the record whether the magistrate actually meant he had enough
evidence to bindover but on a lesser charge or whether the magistrate believed that the
state had met its burden as to the other elements of the offense but not on the value of the
recovered property and its link to Mr. Rogers. R. 222:54-56. Stating, "I am in a situation
where I don't have enough information about how much material was found and the
value of the material found as contrasted with the value of the material stolen. This isn't
burglary. This isn't a burglary charge." R. 222:58. The magistrate's recognition that the
state had not presented "enough information" regarding what property was recovered or
its value demonstrates that the court did not have enough evidence to bindover due to the
state's failure to present sufficient evidence on an essential element of the offense.
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by the defendant to the officer and the statements made by the codefendant, that he's tagged with all the baseball cards available here. So, in
that sense, the -the baseball cards that were stolen clearly exceeded the
value of $5,000.
And the-the problem I have at this point is that I don't know how many
baseball cards or sets of baseball cards were actually recovered, and I'd
have to make a-an assumption that the value of the cards that was actually
found at the apartment and in the car, was up to the - you know, sufficiently
high an amount, that -that that's where we are. And I just don't have any
information on that.
Now, I-I'm willing to accept that all the baseball cards involved here, the
defendant gets tagged with for purposes of this hearing; but I don't know
how many sets of baseball cards there were or how far it reaches in terms of
value that were actually found.
It's very general testimony about having found some binders and some
sheets in the car and at the apartment and individual baseball cards at
various places. And you know, I'm very tempted to assume that-that those
were the bulk of what was there, but just based on what I've heard, I'm
-I'm not going to assume that.
R. 222:54-56.
The court then indicated that it would give the state nthe option of covering [the
value of the recovered property] with further testimony at a continued hearing." R.
222:56. The court then stated, "I still am in a situation where I don't have enough
information about how much material was found and the value of the material found as
contrasted with the value of the material stolen." R. 222:58.
Under these circumstances, the magistrate was without discretion to allow the
state to re-open and to continue the hearing to allow the state the further opportunity to
present sufficient evidence on the proof of value element after the state had not been
44

diligent in its efforts to prepare for the first preliminary hearing. This is precisely the sort
of piecemeal procedure that Brickey and its jurisprudence seeks to prevent. The
magistrate's decision, in sum, abrogated Mr. Rogers' due process rights and his
protections under the Brickey jurisprudence. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647.
The cases cited in Brickey demonstrate the potentially abusive practice in allowing
the state to re-open or continue a preliminary hearing under circumstances like those that
exist in this case. For example, in basing its decision in part on a desire "[t]o curb . . .
abusive practices," the supreme court cited, inter alia, Holmes v. District Court. 668 P.2d
11,15 (Colo. 1983); StockwelL 573 P.2d at 138-39 (Bistline, J. dissenting). The abusive
practice eschewed in Holmes was "the undesirable practice of presenting as little
evidence as possible at the preliminary hearing," then refiling charges and conducting an
additional preliminary hearing if the minimal evidence introduced was not sufficient.
Holmes. 668 P.2d at 15. In the portion of Holmes cited in Brickey. the Colorado
Supreme Court recognized the threat to the role of the preliminary hearing caused by
prosecutors resorting to this abusive practice. Where there are no ramifications for a
failure to present sufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing, "there is little incentive
to comply with the requirements governing preliminary hearings." Id.
Indeed, the potential for abuse in allowing the state to re-open or continue a
preliminary hearing when the magistrate is not convinced that sufficient evidence exists
to bindover are illustrated in the magistrates's comments regarding the preparation of
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prosecutors in the other preliminary hearings he had presided over. The magistrate
stated:
. . . These preliminary hearings, for one reason or other, seem to come
together fairly quickly; often the attorneys who are presenting them for the
State are not the attorneys that maybe put the case together. That's the way
life goes, I understand, the pressures that people are operating under here.
But I also am seeing some real bare minimums on preliminary hearings,
that make me a little uncomfortable. On occasion, I've felt uncomfortable
not to bind over, but it seems to me that there's some fairly easy elements
of proof here and ways in which the proof can be presented.
I- I personally would like to see more proof than I sometimes get in these
cases tying values, people to objects and things like that. I recognize on
-on some point that there- there may be a level of diminishing returns for
the various components in here. I've indicated where I have some concerns
at this point. . . .
R. 222:60-61.
In addition, defense counsel's arguments during the motion to quash hearing
reflect that re-opening preliminary hearings appears to be happening with some
frequency when prosecutors' "bare minimum[]" evidence was insufficient to obtain a
bindover. Voicing concern regarding this potentially abusive practice, defense counsel
stated:
Of course, I have issues with the re-opening of the preliminary hearing. I
think that's a completely inappropriate measure. I think there are other
measures that can be taken and I think this case, certainly, we're not
dealing with an innocent miscalculation of the evidence, we're dealing with
the State making a calculated risk by going forward with what they know to
be limited evidence and taking that risk by going forward. And I think
once they've taken that risk, I don't think they get a third bite at the apple
to try again and again and again and again.
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And the other issue that I brought up in my motion that I hope the Court
will give serious consideration to is the fact that we're running into this
situation often where preliminary hearings are allowed to be re-opened
where essentially defense counsel is aiding in the prosecution of their own
clients because we're pointing out defects in the case. And then what
happens is the State then gets an opportunity to come back a second or
third time, even and correct those defects, where the case should have been
legitimately dismissed or at least bound over at a much lesser level, had the
preliminary hearing process stopped at the point both parties had rested.
R. 224:4-5.
Defense counsel's concerns regarding the potential abuse inherent in the power to
re-open or continue a preliminary hearing because the state failed to come prepared with
the necessary evidence to bindover are similar to those articulated by the dissenting
opinion in StockwelL cited by the Brickey court, regarding the potential for abuse in
allowing the state to refile charges after miscalculating the amount of evidence necessary
for a bindover. See Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647; StockwelL 573 P.2d at 138-39 (Bistline, J.
dissenting). In StockwelL Justice Bistline states:
To allow a dismissal and refiling every time the prosecutor miscalculates
the quantum of evidence needed to gain the desired commitment, as Judge
Hargraves later ruled,
" . . . would not only do violence to the due process rights of
this Petitioner but would establish a very dangerous precedent
which could adversely affect numerous other person charged
with crime. If the prosecutor could do this once, why not
twice, ten times or innumberable times? Conceivably a
defendant could spend months in jail, not being able to make
bond, and remaining always at the preliminary hearing stage
with never a hope for an early trial on the merits of the case ..
»i

StockwelL 573 P.2d at 138-39 (Bistline, J. dissenting).
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Indeed, allowing a preliminary hearing to be re-opened or continued under
circumstances such as these would completely nullify the requirements of rule 7(i) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and the constitutional limits outlined in the Brickey
jurisprudence. Instead,
If the State has sufficient evidence to bring an accused to trial, it should be
prepared to offer such at one preliminary examination and not rely on
bolstering its case at a subsequent preliminary examination, if necessary. It
is dilatory to present evidence on an installment basis at different
preliminaries. Let the State present its case at the preliminary and be done
with it. If it is insufficient, then the prosecution is at an end unless new
evidence becomes available or other good cause is shown. Not only is
refiling without cause unnecessarily burdensome to our overcrowded
courts, but it may constitute harassment of an accused.
Jones. 481 P.2d at 171 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
Although, the supreme court noted in Brickey. the holding of Harper v. District
Court of Oklahoma Co.. 484 P.2d 891 (1971) "that good cause to continue a preliminary
hearing for further investigation might exist when a prosecutor innocently miscalculates
the quantum of evidence required to obtain a bindover and further investigation clearly
would not be dilatory," our supreme court did not adopt the "good cause to continue"
aspect of the holding. Brickey. 714 P.2d 644. 647 n.5. Instead, in Morgan. the supreme
court adopted "innocent miscalculation as a subsection of other good cause . ..
[justifying refiling]." Morgan. 2001 UT 87 at 1J19. Reading the Morgan holding to
include continuances would set an extremely negative precedent and would "infringe on
[the] due process rights of a defendant." IJL Even if this Court were to interpret the
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Morgan holding as permitting continuances for good cause, good cause did not exist in
this case where the prosecutor was clearly dilatory in her preparation for the first
preliminary hearing. See Point 1.
The magistrate determined that the state had failed to present sufficient evidence
on the proof of value element to allow the court to bind Mr. Rogers over on a second
degree felony charge. R. 222:54-58. Once the judge had determined that there was
insufficient evidence on an essential element of the offense presented, the judge was
required under rule 7(i) to either discharge and dismiss Mr. Rogers or bind him over on a
lesser charge. If the court had dismissed the charge at this point, the state would have
been barred from refiling because the prosecutor's dilatory preparation does not qualify
as an innocent miscalculation. Therefore, allowing the state the opportunity to produce
sufficient evidence to support a second degree felony charge by re-opening and
continuing the hearing was not harmless error. Even if the Court were to recognize a
magistrate's discretion to grant a continuance absent a procedural rule allowing it, a
continuance must still be limited by due process and Brickey. Otherwise, continuances
would eviscerate the Brickey rule since it would allow prosecutors to circumvent due
process and the protections offered by the Brickey jurisprudence regardless of
circumstance.
In sum, a prosecutor's decision to go forward with a preliminary hearing
unprepared does not qualify as an innocent miscalculation justifying refiling. Therefore,
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when the prosecutor's failure to prepare results in insufficient evidence being presented
on essential elements of the offense charged, the magistrate is required to either dismiss
the charge or bindover on a lesser offense. Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not recognize a motion to re-open. Nor does Rule 1102 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence allow a continuance to be granted so the prosecution can attempt
again to establish essential elements of the offense. Allowing either a continuance or a
motion to re-open is akin to allowing the state to dismiss and refile a case while
effectively circumventing due process and the protections outlined in Brickey. Because
the state would have been prohibited from refiling under these circumstances, the error
was not harmless.
CONCLUSION
Appellant Daniel Bagley Rogers respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
district court's denial of his motion to quash the bindover and order the information to be
dismissed. Alternatively, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court order the
charges to be reduced to a class A misdemeanor.
SUBMITTED THIS
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DEBRA M. NELSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

MEMORANDUM DECISION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

(Motion to Quash Bindover)
vs.

Case No. 021101432 FS

DANIEL ROGERS,
Judge PAT B. BRIAN

Defendant.

f1

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on April 29, 2003 for hearing on Daniel

Rogers (Defendant) Motion to Quash Bindover. The Court has reviewed Defendant's motion
and supplemental memorandum and the State's opposition to Defendant's motion. Having
considered those memoranda along with oral arguments, the applicable constitutional provisions,
statutes and case law, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to quash.
BACKGROUND
Tf2

On August 20, 2002, the Defendant was charged by information for theft by receiving

stolen property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 and theft by
deception, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405.
Tf3

A preliminary hearing was scheduled for November 7, 2002. On November 4, 2002, the

State requested a continuance. That same day, the Court granted the State's motion to continue
and the preliminary hearing was rescheduled for November 26, 2002.
%4

On November 26, 2002, Defendant failed to appear. The Court issued a bench warrant

for Defendant and rescheduled the preliminary hearing for December 17, 2002.
J5

On December 17, 2002, the preliminary hearing was held before the court, Roth, J.

000175

Tf6

The following facts, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, were established at

the December 17, 2002, preliminary hearing. On July 23, 2002, sometime between one p.m. to
eight p.m., Robert Paul Hildebrand's, (Hildebrand) apartment was broken into and many items
stolen. Specifically, an unopened six disc, DVD player worth $750, a minolta 35 mm camera
worth $200, a pioneer stereo with a six disc player, originally worth $900 present value $400500, twelve (12) autographed baseballs total value between $1450-1850, ten (10) binders of
baseball cards total value about $5000, autographed cards total value between $5330-6400, a set
of black pearl earrings originally cost $1250 with a present value of $1500, and Olympic pins
worth $200. Hildebrand contacted the police department.
%J

The following day, on July 24, 2002, Hildebrand contacted several, local baseball card

shops to tell them to watch for the stolen items. Hildebrand contacted baseball card shop owner,
Elvin Allen (Allen), about the stolen baseballs and cards. Within an hour, two men entered
Allen's store with items that Allen believed were Hildebrand's stolen items. Allen purchased
some of the items from the men using a check. Allen immediately contacted Hildebrand and
informed Hildebrand that he had Hildenbrand's stolen items.
f8

Allen cancelled the check. Later that day, Allen received a call from a check cashing

place, as shown on his caller ID. Allen contacted Hildebrand and told him that the people were
attempting to cash the check at a check cashing place and gave Hildebrand the phone number
displayed on his caller ID.
^|9

Hildebrand contacted the police and gave them the phone number to trace the address of

the check cashing location. The police arrived and observed a signed, encased baseball in the
front seat and a baseball card on the floor of the front, passenger seat of the vehicle that the
-2-

Defendant and his companion, Joshua Boone (Boone) arrived in. The vehicle that Defendant and
Boone arrived in was owned by Boone's girlfriend. The police detained Defendant and Boone.
In the trunk of the vehicle, were many baseball cards. Defendant informed the police that he
found the baseball cards in a dumpster. Thereafter, police discovered at Boone's apartment,
multiple baseballs, binders, baseball cards, DVD/CD player, and Olympic pins.
TflO

At the December 17, 2002 hearing, after the State rested, Defendant argued that there was

insufficient evidence to bindover. Specifically, Defendant argued that the value of the items was
not sufficiently established to bindover for the second degree felony charge because the only
evidence associated with Defendant was one baseball and one card. Even viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the State, this did not amount to $5000, which is an element of the
charge for theft by receiving stolen property. Defendant argued, therefore, that the bindover
should be denied on that count.
^11

The State moved to reopen because the Prosecutor was "given some more information"

and needed to take some further testimony. Defendant objected, arguing that the State rested its
case. The Court granted the motion to reopen.
T|12

The State recalled the police officer to the stand and asked him questions about the black

pearl earrings. The officer indicated that the earrings were pawned. Although the officer did not
have the pawn receipt with him, he recalled that it was in evidence at the sheriffs office.
f 13

The Court sua sponte continued the hearing on the limited issue of value of the items

found that were attributable to Defendant, which the Court stated was the baseballs and baseball
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cards found in the car and the home.1 Defendant objected arguing that a continuance was in
opposition to the purpose of a preliminary hearing because after the State rests its case and
Defense counsel reveals all of the State's weaknesses, the court can just grant a continuance,
allow the State to gather more evidence for the next hearing, so that there would be sufficient
evidence to bindover the Defendant.
U 14

On January 7, 2003 a hearing was held on the limited issue of the value of the items

found attributable to the Defendant in the car and at the home.
Tfl5

The Court, Roth, /., bound over for trial the first charge for theft by receiving

stolen property, a second degree felony, in violation of § 76-6-408 and dismissed the second
charge for theft by deception, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of § 76-6-405
LAW
^16

At a preliminary hearing "the prosecution must present evidence sufficient for the

magistrate to find probable cause to believe that the crime charged had been committed and that
the defendant has committed it. . . . The evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
prosecution with all inferences resolved in the prosecution's favor. . . . The defendant should be
bound over for trial unless the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference
to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim." State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26,
^[10,44 P.3d 730 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.). Recently, the Utah
Supreme Court clarified that the "quantum of evidence necessary to support a bindover is less

1

The Court also continued the hearing on the issue of the earrings and the pawn ticket.
Defendant objected and the State stipulated that the earrings and pawn ticket would not be an
issue at the next hearing.
-4-
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than that necessary to survive a directed verdict motion." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, Tfl6, 20
P.3d 300. While the prosecution must produce "believable evidence of all the elements of the
crime charged" in order to sustain its burden at the preliminary hearing stage, "unlike a motion
for a directed verdict, this evidence need not be capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. at Tf 15.
1J17

Section 76-6-408 provides that theft by receiving stolen property occurs when:
A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the
property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing
that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds
or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the property from the
owner, knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the
owner of it.

Tfl8

Theft of property is a second degree felony if the value of the property or services is or

exceeds $5000. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(a)(i). If the value of the property stolen is less
than $300 then the theft charge is a class B misdemeanor. § 76-6-412(l)(d).
ANALYSIS
Tfl9

Defendant claims that the Court improperly granted the State's motion to reopen.

Specifically, Defendant argues that a motion to 'reopen' a preliminary hearing is not a motion
recognized in the Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure citing State v. Johnson, 1989 Utah App.
LEXIS 172, *3 (October 30, I989)(unpublishedopinion).
^[20

In opposition, the State argues that there was sufficient evidence to establish the second

degree felony charge before the Court granted the State's motion to reopen. The Court agrees
with the State.
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f21

The Court concludes that there was sufficient evidence presented before the motion to

reopen was granted because the evidence presented established that Defendant was in possession
or control of $5000 or more of stolen property. The evidence showed that Defendant was in
possession or control of the property that was pawned to Allen because the check was written in
Defendant's name. Defendant was also in possession or control of the property that was in the
vehicle that Defendant and Boone arrived in at the check cashing place. The evidence reflected
that there was a signed, encased baseball in the front seat and a baseball card on the front, floor
of the passenger seat. In the trunk of the vehicle there were multiple baseball cards. Defense
counsel inquired of the Court, Roth, J., whether the evidence at the apartment would be
considered and the Court, Roth, J., affirmed that it would be. Defense counsel did not object.
Applying the evidence obtained in the apartment as well as the evidence obtained in the vehicle
and at the pawn shop, the Court concludes that there was sufficient evidence from Hildebrand's
testimony that the value of the stolen property recovered was $5000 or more.2

2

Nevertheless, the Court notes that although a motion to reopen is not a motion within
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court's, Roth, J., granting of the motion to reopen was
harmless error. The Court could have dismissed the charges under Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3).
However, the dismissal and discharge would not have precluded the State from refiling because
good cause to re-file exists "when a prosecutor innocently miscalculates the quantum of evidence
required to obtain a bindover." State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, ^|14, 34 P.3d 767 (Utah
200\)(citing State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 n.5 (Utah 1986). It is clear to this Court that
there were no abusive practices involved in the State's motion to reopen, but simply an innocent
miscalculation of the evidence necessary to bindover. Witnesses that were called at the first
hearing were recalled during that hearing and at the second hearing to provide more detail about
the value of the items. There does not appear to be any bad faith on the part of the prosecutor,
which is what could prevent the State from refiling. Since the result would have been the same
because the State could have refiled and another preliminary hearing could have been held before
the Court, Roth, J., this Court notes that even if the evidence was insufficient, the Court, Roth, J.,
committed harmless error that was not prejudicial to the Defendant. If anything, the Court, Roth,
J., prevented an inconvenience to the Defendant by reopening the State's case. State v. Morgan,
-6-
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Tf22

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to quash

So ordered this/7? day of June, 2003.

Judge PAT B. BRIA^ \
Third District Court%d&e »' ,,

2001 UT 87, f 10.
-7-

ADDENDUM B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT AND
ORDER

vs.
DANIEL ROGERS,
Defendant.

Case No. 021101432
031100601
031100343
Judge Terry Christiansen

C O M E S NOW, DANIEL ROGERS, the defendant in this case, and hereby
acknowledges and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea of guilty to the following crime(s):
CRIME AND STATUTE

DEGREE

PUNISHMENT

Theft by Receiving Stolen Property,
§76-6-408(021101432)

3 ° Felony

0-5 years USP; $0-5,000 fine + 85%
surcharge

Burglary, §76-6-202
(031100601)

2° Felony

1-15 years prison; fine up to $10,000
plus an 85% surcharge.

Theft,
§76-6-404(031100343)

3° Felony

0-5 years USP; $0-5,000 fine + 85%
surcharge

The elements of the crime(s) of which I am pleading guilty are as follows:
The defendant, a party to the offense, entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling of another,
in Salt Lake County, with the intent to commit a theft.
The defendant, a party to the offense, did receive, retain, or dispose of the property of another
knowing that it had been stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, or did conceal, sell,
withhold or aid in the concealment, selling, or withholding of the property from the owner, knowing
the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it.
The defendant, a party to the offense, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the
property of Deloris Lenhart with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the value of hte
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property is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000.
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable, that
constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charged are as follows:
Case Number 021101432 — On July 23, 2002,1 possessed property belonging to Robert Paul
Hildebrand, knowing or believing that such property had probably been stolen, and I intended to
deprive Mr. Hildebrand of the property. The value of the property was between $1,000 but less than
$5,000.
Case Number 031100601 - Between November 1, 2002, and January 15, 2003,1 unlawfully
entered the home of Ben and Ed Rogers, located at 12100 East Big Cottonwood Road, in Salt Lake
County, with the intent to commit a theft.
Case Number 031100343 - On July 5, 2002,1 possessed a number of belongings/property
belonging to Deloris Lenhart with the intent to deprive Ms. Lenhart of the property and the value of
the property was more than $1,000 but less than $5,000.
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and understanding of the
following facts:
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I recognize
that a condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as determined
by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if appointed for me.
2. I have not waived my right to counsel. My attorney is Shannon Romero, and I have
had an opportunity to discuss this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my
guilty plea(s) with my attorney.
3. I have read this statement and understand the nature and elements of the charges, my
rights in this and other proceedings and the consequences of my pleas of guilty.
4. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury, and a right to a speedy trial in open court
by an impartial jury.
5. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that
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I have the right to compel my witness(s) by subpoena at State expense to testify in
court in my behalf.
6. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf; but if I choose not to do so I
cannot be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself; and no adverse
inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify,
7. I know that if I wish to contest the charges against me I need only plead "not guilty,"
and the matter will be set for trial. At the trial, the State of Utah will have the burden
of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before
a jury the verdict must be unanimous.
8. I know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I were tried and convicted by a jury or
the judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah
Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court, and that if I could not
afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be paid by the State.
9. I know the maximum sentence(s) set forth above may be imposed for each offense to
which I plead guilty, and that the sentence(s) and may be for a prison term, fine, or
both. I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge,
required by the Utah Code Annotated 63-63a-4, will be imposed. I also know that I
may be ordered by the Court to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes,
including restitution on charges dismissed as part of this plea agreement.
10.

I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods if my plea is to more
than once charge. I also know that the court may order that the sentences will
run consecutively if these offenses were committed while I was imprisoned, on
probation, on parole, or awaiting sentencing.

11.

I know and understand that by pleading guilty , I am waiving and giving up my
statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also
know that by entering such plea(s), I am admitting and do so admit that I have
committed the conduct alleged and that I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my
plea(s) (is) (are) entered.
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12.

I understand that any motion to withdraw my guilty plea(s) must be filed within
thirty (30) days after sentencing, plea. I understand that any motion to
withdraw my guilty plea(s) will only be granted if the Court finds good cause to
do so.

13.

My plea(s) of guilty is the result of a plea bargain between myself and the
prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties, and provisions of this plea bargain,
if any, are fully set forth as follows:
* Dismiss remaining charges, dismiss case number 031100193
* Restitution on all cases
* State stipulates to a recommendation of suspended prison time with Odyssey House
inpatient as a condition of probation.
* 2nd degree felony and 3rd degree felony sentences to run consecutively but suspended; two
3 rd degree felony sentences to run concurrently to each other.
* Sery plea on case number 021101432, preserving the right to appeal the trial court's
decision on defense counsel's motion (Order issued June 16,2003)
There are no other promises.

14. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation or probation or
suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by
either my defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also
know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the Judge may do are
also not binding on the Judge.
15. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind has been made to induce me to
plead guilty, and no promises except those in this document have been made to me.
16. I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand
it. I know that I am free to change or take out anything contained in this statement. I do
not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct.
17. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
18. I am 2pt-\ years of age; I have attended school through the

/ ^/

grade. I can read

and understand the English language. I am not under the influence of any drug,
medication, or intoxicants.
19. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind; mentally capable of understanding
the proceedings and the consequences of my plea; and free of any mental disease, defect,
or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
entering my plea.
Page 4
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Dated this 15

day of September, 2003.

>ANIEL ROGERS, DEFENDANT
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for DANIEL ROGERS, the defendant above, and that I know
he has read the statement or that I have read it to him and I have discussed it with him and believe
that he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent.
To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the elements of
the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and
these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing
affidavit, are accurate and true.
SHANNON ROMERO 7974

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against DANIEL ROGERS,
the defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the declaration, including
the elements of the offense of the charges(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal
conduct which constitutes the offense(s) are true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or
coercion to encourage a plea has been offered to the defendant. The plea negotiations are fully
contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement or as supplemented on the record
before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) (is) (are) entered and acceptance of
the plea(s) would serve the public interest.

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY/BAR # y ? 3 f
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ORDER
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and the certification of the defendant
and counsel, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds that the defendant's plea(s) of guilty is
freely and voluntarily made, and
IT IS SO ORDERED that the defendant's plea of guilty to the charge(s) set forth in the
statement be accepted and entered.
DONE IN COURT this

1~7

day of September, 2003.
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Rule 7. Proceedings before magistrate.
(a) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant
shall appear before the court as directed in the summons.
(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest with or without
a warrant, the person arrested shall be taken to the nearest available
magistrate for setting of bail. If an information has not been filed, one shall be
filed without delay before the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense.
(c)(1) In order to detain any person arrested without a warrant, as soon as
is reasonably feasible but in no event longer than 48 hours after the arrest, a
determination shall be made as to whether there is probable cause to continue
to detain the arrestee. The determination may be made by any magistrate,
although if the arrestee is charged with a first degree felony or a capital
offense, the magistrate may not be a justice court judge. The arrestee need not
be present at the probable cause determination.
(c)(2) A written probable cause statement shall be presented to the magistrate, although the statement may be verbally communicated by telephone,
telefaxed, or otherwise electronically transmitted to the magistrate.
(c)(2)(A) A statement which is verbally communicated by telephone shall be
reduced to a sworn written statement prior to submitting the probable cause
issue to the magistrate for decision. The person reading the statement to the
magistrate shall verify to the magistrate that the person is reading the written
statement verbatim, and shall write on the statement that person's name and
title, the date and time of the communication with the magistrate, and the
determination the magistrate directs to be indicated on the statement.
(c)(2)(B) If a statement is verbally communicated by telephone, telefaxed, or
otherwise electronically transmitted, the original statement shall, as soon as
practicable, be filed with the court where the case will be filed.
(c)(3) The magistrate shall review the probable cause statement and from it
determine whether there is probable cause to continue to detain the arrestee.
(c)(3)(A) If the magistrate finds there is not probable cause to continue to
detain the arrestee, the magistrate shall order the immediate release of the
arrestee.
(c)(3)(B) If the magistrate finds probable cause to continue to detain the
arrestee, the magistrate shall immediately make a bail determination. The
bail determination shall coincide with the recommended bail amount in the
Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule unless the magistrate finds substantial cause to
deviate from the Schedule.
(c)(4) The presiding district court judge shall, in consultation with the
Justice Court Administrator, develop a rotation of magistrates which assures
availability of magistrates consistent with the need in that particular district.
The schedule shall take into account the case load of each of the magistrates,
their location and their willingness to serve.
(c)(5) Nothing in this subsection (c) is intended to preclude the accomplishment of other procedural processes at the time of the determination referred to
in paragraph (c)(1) above.
(d)(1) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was
committed the person arrested shall without unnecessary delay be returned to
the county where the crime was committed and shall be taken before the
proper magistrate under these rules.
(d)(2) If for any reason the person arrested cannot be promptly returned to
the county and the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor for which
a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under Subsection
77-7-21(1), the person arrested may state in writing a desire to forfeit bail,
waive trial in the district in which the information is pending, and consent to
disposition of the case in the county in which the person was arrested, is held,
or is present.
(d)(3) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of the court in
which the information is pending shall transmit the papers in the proceeding
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or copies of them to the clerk of the court for the county in which the defendant
is arrested, held, or present. The prosecution shall continue in t h a t county.
(d)(4) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that issued the
warrant.
(d)(5) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a misdemeanor
for which a voluntary forfeiture oi bail may be entered as a conviction under
Subsection 77-7-21(1), the defendant shall be taken without unnecessary delay
before a magistrate within the county of arrest for the determination of bail
under Section 77-20-1 and released on bail or held without bail under Section
77-20-1.
(d)(6) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdiction over the
offense, with the record made of the proceedings before the magistrate.
(e) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon
the defendant's first appearance, inform the defendant:
(e)(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy;
(e)(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the information and how to obtain them;
(e)(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court
without expense if unable to obtain counsel;
(e)(4) of rights concerning pretrial release, including bail, and
(e)(5) t h a t the defendant is noi required to make any statement, and t h a t
the statements the defendant does make may be used against the defendant in
a court of law.
(f) The magistrate shall, after providing the information under paragraph
(e) and before proceeding further, allow the defendant reasonable time and
opportunity to consult counsel and shall allow the defendant to contact any
attorney by any reasonable means, without delay and without fee.
(g) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magistrate
shall call upon the defendant to enter a plea.
(g)(1) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by the magistrate as provided by law.
(g)(2) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date may not be
extended except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held under these rules
and law applicable to criminal cases.
(h)(1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant shall be advised
of the right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives the right to
a preliminary examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate shall order the defendant bound over to answer in the district court.
(h)(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the
magistrate shall schedule the preliminary examination. The examination shall
be held within a reasonable time, but not later t h a n ten days if the defendant
is in custody for the offense charged and not later t h a n 30 days if the defendant
is not in custody. These time periods may be extended by the magistrate for
good cause shown. A preliminary examination may not be held if the defendant
is indicted.
(i)(l) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held
under the rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The
state has the burden of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the
conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call
witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine
adverse witnesses.
(i)(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that
the crime charged has been committed and t h a t the defendant has committed
it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, t h a t the defendant be bound over to
answer in the district court. The findings of probable cause may be based on
hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground t h a t it was
acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary
examination.
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(i)(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal.
The dismissal and discharge do not preclude the state from instituting a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
(j) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either
party, may exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses
not to converse with each other until the preliminary examination is concluded. On the request of either party, the magistrate may order all spectators
to be excluded from the courtroom.
(k)(l) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district
court, the magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall
transmit to the clerk of the district court all pleadings in and records made of
the proceedings before the magistrate, including exhibits, recordings, and any
typewritten transcript.
(k)(2) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the sheriff,
the magistrate shall execute the appropriate commitment order.
(1X1) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material
witness in a pending case will not appear and testify unless bond is required,
the magistrate may fix a bond with or without sureties and in a sum considered
adequate for the appearance of the witness.
(1)(2) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the clerk of the
court, the magistrate may commit the witness to jail until the witness complies
or is otherwise legally discharged.
(1X3) If the witness does provide bond when required, the witness may be
examined and cross-examined before the magistrate in the presence of the
defendant and the testimony shall be recorded. The witness shall then be
discharged.
(1)(4) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent
hearing or trial when ordered to do so, the recorded testimony may be used at
the hearing or trial in lieu of the personal testimony of the witness.
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; November 1, 1996; April 29, 1998; April 1,
1999; April 1, 2004.)
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1998
amendment is made in recognition of district
court consolidation, whereby a district court
judge may sit as a committing magistrate. Rule
7(h)(1) as amended permits a defendant who
has waived the preliminary examination, or
has been bound over, to enter a plea immediately before the district judge and avoid the
necessity of additional appearances.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 2004 amendment added Subdivision (c) and redesignated
the following subdivisions accordingly.
Cross-References. — Court reporters, Title
78, Chapter 56.
Exclusion of witnesses and others, § 78-7-4.

Juvenile committing felony, hearing and certification to district court, § 78-3a-603.
Juvenile court, transfer of criminal proceeding to, § 78-3a-501.
Police lineup, right to have attorney present,
§ 77-8-2
Preliminary examination may be waived,
Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 13.
Rights of accused persons. Utah Const., Art.
I, Sees. 7 to 12; § 77-1-6.
Rules of Evidence inapplicable to proceedings
for b a i l Rule 1101, U.R.E.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
Appeals.
Duties of magistrate.
Preliminary hearing.
—Binding accused over.
Different offense.
Failure to sign order.
— Concurrent jurisdiction of circuit and district
courts.

—Evidence.
—Nature of right.
—Necessity.
—Public access.
—Right to counsel.
Waiver.
—Standard of proof.
—Time.
Delay for good cause.

Rule 1102. Reliable hearsay in criminal preliminary examinations.
(a) Statement of the rule. Reliable hearsay is admissible at criminal preliminary examinations.
(b) Definition of reliable hearsay. For purposes of criminal preliminary
examinations only, reliable hearsay includes:
(b)(1) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under the Utah Rules of Evidence;
(b)(2) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under Rule 804 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence, regardless of the availability of the declarant at the preliminary
examination;
(b)(3) evidence establishing the foundation for or the authenticity of any
exhibit;
(b)(4) scientific, laboratory, or forensic reports and records;
(b)(5) medical and autopsy reports and records;
(b)(6) a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying peace
officer;
(b)(7) a statement made by a child victim of physical abuse or a sexual
offense which is promptly reported by the child victim and recorded in
accordance with Rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
(b)(8) a statement of a declarant that is written, recorded, or transcribed
verbatim which is:
(b)(8)(A) under oath or affirmation; or
(b)(8)(B) pursuant to a notification to the declarant that a false statement
made therein is punishable;
(b)(9) other hearsay evidence with similar indicia of reliability, regardless of
admissibility at trial under Rules 803 and 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
(c) Continuance for production of additional evidence. If hearsay evidence is
proffered or admitted in the preliminary examination, a continuance of the
hearing may be granted for the purpose of furnishing additional evidence if:
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(c)(1) The magistrate finds that the hearsay evidence proffered or admitted
is not sufficient and additional evidence is necessary for a bindover; or
(c)(2) The defense establishes that it would be so substantially and unfairly
disadvantaged by the use of the hearsay evidence as to outweigh the interests
of the declarant and the efficient administration of justice.
(Added effective April 1, 1999.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 1102
applies only in criminal preliminary examinations, and implements language added by
amendment to Article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution, effective July 1, 1995:
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to
a preliminary examination, the function of that
examination is limited to determining whether
probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution
shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or
in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant
if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by
statute or rule.
Discovery is allowed under Rule 16, Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as by case
law and other statutes.
Accordingly, paragraph (a) provides for admissibility of "reliable hearsay" evidence in
criminal preliminary examinations (commonly
called "preliminary hearings"). To the extent
that State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah
1980), prohibited the use of hearsay evidence at
preliminary examinations, that case has been
abrogated.
Paragraph (b) defines ^reliable hearsay" in
subparagraphs (1) through (8). Evidence which
is admissible under any other law or rule of
evidence is not rendered inadmissible by anything in paragraph (b).
Subparagraph (b)(2) specifically incorporates
hearsay t h a t would be admissible under U.R.E.
804 but eliminates the foundational element of
unavailability.
Subparagraph (b)(3) permits the admission
of exhibits in preliminary hearings even though
the necessary foundation for admissibility is by
hearsay only. For example, proving the chain of
custody for controlled substances may be accomplished under this section without calling
the witnesses in the chain.
Subparagraphs (b)(4) and (b)(5) permit the
specified types of reports and records to be
admitted without the testimony of the person
who prepared the report or record or the custodian of the record. If there is special reason for
exploring foundation or authenticity, subparagraph (c) gives the magistrate power to require
additional evidence after a continuance.
Subparagraph (b)(6) is similar to the "fellow
officer" rule applicable to search or arrest warr a n t affidavits as providing sufficiently "reliable" evidence.

Subparagraph (b)(7) requires that a child
victim's hearsay report be close in time to the
event reported and that it be recorded in compliance with the conditions prescribed in Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure 15.5(l)(a) through
(d). This subparagraph does not necessitate a
hearing under Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 15.5(1 )(e) through (h) as a prerequisite to
admission at a preliminary examination.
Under subparagraph (b)(8), written, recorded, or transcribed testimony of non-testifying witnesses is admissible if it is sworn, affirmed, or given under notification that false
statements are prosecutable. The potential for
prosecution under perjury or other criminal
provisions tends to ensure the reliability of
such testimony.
Subparagraph (b)(9) provides catchall admissibility for other forms of hearsay of similar
reliability, not unlike U.R.E. Rules 803(24) and
804(5) provide under existing hearsay exceptions. Unlike U.R.E. Rules 803(24) and 804(5),
there is no requirement that advance notice be
given to the adverse party of evidence offered
under subparagraph (b)(9). If there is special
reason for exploring foundation or authenticity,
subparagraph (c) gives the magistrate power to
require additional evidence after a continuance.
Paragraph (c) provides for continuances in
the preliminary examination to enable a party
to provide live witnesses or a more reliable form
of hearsay where a party is substantially disadvantaged by the admission or exclusion of
hearsay evidence proffered under this rule.
Under subparagraph (c)(1), the prosecution
can get a continuance where hearsay evidence
is not admitted and would be necessary to get
the case bound over.
Under subparagraph (c)(2), a defendant may
obtain a continuance by demonstrating that he
is substantially and unfairly disadvantaged by
a particular proffer of evidence that would be
otherwise admissible under the rule and the
disadvantage outweighs the interests of the
witness and the efficient administration of justice. In making a decision as to whether the
defendant is substantially and unfairly disadvantaged by the use of reliable hearsay evidence, a magistrate may, among other factors,
take into consideration the limitations on discovery available to the defendant.
Either party is at liberty to subpoena and call
any live witnesses whose testimony would be
germane to the determination of probable
cause.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec* 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

